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THURSDAY MORNING, SEPT. 22.

NOVEL VIEWS.

Some weeks ago we published the substance of a letter by the Hon. Wm. C. Rives, of Va., upon the political question of the day, and took occasion to commend the excellent judgment and patriotic spirit which it displayed. We perceive that the letter has been copied by the Washington *Constitution*, and its views in relation to slavery are declared by that journal to be substantially the same as those of the Administration and the National Democracy. Mr. Rives recently Mr. Sumner has written another letter, which we find in the Vicksburg *Sentinel* in reply to certain queries elicited by former epistle. In the one before us Mr. Rives hazards an opinion which may be regarded startling by many, but which, nevertheless, he demonstrates, as we think, in a conclusive and irrefutable manner. It is to the effect that there is not a syllable in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case from beginning to end, which leads the most cautious mind to the idea that Congress possesses the least power to establish slavery in the Territories, or that there is the remotest suggestion that it is duty of Congress to pass laws for the protection of slavery in the Territories. On the contrary, so far as that decision says anything on the subject of the power of Congress, its clear implication is a denial to Congress of any power to legislate at all, for or against, in relation to slavery in the Territories.

We regret that our space does not permit us to republish Mr. Rives's able and interesting letter in extenso, since its comprehensiveness and condensation is no easy task. His argument may however be briefly stated as follows:

The question of the power of Congress in relation to slavery in the Territories is not before the Supreme Court. The question was, "is Dred Scott a slave?" Its incident to that question, and necessary to its decision, "what was the effect of the act of Congress prohibiting the introduction of slavery into territory of the United States, upon the individual condition of freedom or slavery, of a slave who had been carried into such prohibited ground?" This was the sole point before the Court. The misconception of the decision of the tribunal is based upon a single paragraph, which, though taken singly, and torn from the context, gives no warrant for the conclusion touching a Congressional Code in the Territories. The paragraph is as follows:

"As we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The rights of the owner in his property are declared to be the same as those pertaining to property of any other description. The clause in the Constitution which gives Congress a power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to special protection, though property of every other description is left to the protection of the general government, and to the laws and regulations established by the sovereign power in each State, in which the property shall be found, or through which it may be transported, cannot be construed to confer upon a Territorial Legislature, created by Congress, a power to impair the rights of property in slaves, which the Constitution of the United States was intended to protect in every part of the country, and which it does protect, wherever the laws of a State or Territory do not interfere, by any act or law, to impair the rights of property in slaves, which the laws of the place where the property is found, or through which it may be lawfully transported, do not prohibit."

Mr. Rives says the foregoing passage refers to the power granted by the Constitution on Congress to legislate on fugitive slaves, and Mr. Sumner says that it bears no other meaning. In reply to certain queries elicited by Sumner epistle. In the one before us Mr. Rives hazards an opinion which may be regarded startling by many, but which, nevertheless, he demonstrates, as we think, in a conclusive and irrefutable manner. It is to the effect that there is not a syllable in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case from beginning to end, which leads the most cautious mind to the idea that Congress possesses the least power to establish slavery in the Territories, or that there is the remotest suggestion that it is duty of Congress to pass laws for the protection of slavery in the Territories. On the contrary, so far as that decision says anything on the subject of the power of Congress, its clear implication is a denial to Congress of any power to legislate at all, for or against, in relation to slavery in the Territories.

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